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The object of this paper is to study the impact of successive changes in ratings of a leading 
firm on competitors of the same sector. Two courses of research are being mobilized 
regarding, on the one hand, the incidence of downgrading of ratings on the value of the 
firms and on the other hand, the contagion effects associated with the report of bad news. 
The analysis of the successive downgrading of the ratings of Alcatel, world leader in the 
telecommunications infrastructure allows us to point out the contagion effects among the 
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Contagion effects of successive bond rating downgrades 





  Within the context of asymmetry of information between investors and firms, 
certain financial market participants occupy an exclusive position. They are, in particular, 
the financial analysts and the rating agencies. By reducing the asymmetry of information 
between the various actors present on the stock market, the financial analysts contribute to 
the efficiency of the latter. The rating agencies play a similar role for the holders of debt 
securities. The allocation of ratings should especially allow the creditors to adjust the risk 
premium required for the debt securities
3. We can point out that the activities of these two 
categories of information productors are relatively complementary since the new 
information reported by one or by another can be used by the creditors as well as the 
shareholders (Ederington and Goh, 1998). 
                                                 
2 We acknowledge research support from the Research Alliance on Governance and Forensic Accounting 
funded within the research program on the new economy of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada (SSHRC). We gratefully appreciate suggestions and comments from participants at the 
2003 French Finance Association (AFFI) conference in Lyon and especially from Patrick Roger. 
3 Using survey research methodology, Baker and Mansi (2002) confirm the importance of rating companies, 
but these authors find that industrial companies issuing bonds and mutual funds investing in corporate bonds 
differ in some of their assessments about rating agencies.   3
The object of this article is to complete the studies of the reactions of the financial 
market to the information reported by the rating agencies. We will try to verify the idea 
according to which the disclosure of information regarding the solvency of a given firm 
lead investors to review their expectations in relation to the value of the other firms 
evolving in the same sector of activity. Our study is based on two different courses of 
research. 
The first involves the impact that a downgrade by the rating agencies of the solvency 
ratings of firms would have on the value of shares
4. In the United States, various studies 
have pointed out a negative reaction of the financial market upon a report of “bad news” 
concerning ratings. Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) were the first to study this 
phenomenon on daily data. Their results were confirmed by Hand et al.  (1992), who 
obtained an average negative abnormal return of 0,79%, on a sample of 841 reports of 
downgrades of ratings between 1977 and 1982. Ederington and Goh (1998) confirmed these 
results for a more recent period; an average decrease in the value of the shares of 1,29% 
(over a two day period) is observed for the 494 downgrades of ratings reported between 
1984 and 1990
5. 
                                                 
4 The reader interested in the impact of the change of ratings on the bond risk premium may consult Altman 
and Kao (1992) or Hite and Warga (1997). For studies of the link between the yield spread and the return of 
the shares market, see for example Duffee (1998) or Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). Finally, Kliger and Sarig 
(2000) study the wealth transfers between bondholders and shareholders in the case of rating changes.   
5 It also appears that an improvement in the ratings does not have a significant impact on the value of the 
shares. Otherwise, the financial market seems to expect the event. In fact, these studies show that the value of 
the shares generally decreased during the weeks preceding the report of a downgrade in the solvency rating.  
Finally, Dichev and Piotroski (2001) find negative abnormal returns in the first year following downgrades.    4
Outside the United States, and especially in Europe, very few similar studies have 
been published. This occurrence is probably linked to less bondholder financing and 
therefore, to a lesser presence of the rating agencies
6. However, in the United Kingdom, the 
results from Barron et al. (1997) corroborate those obtained on the American market. Using 
weekly data, Matolcsy and Lianto (1995) also confirm this result for the Australian market. 
The analysis of the contagion effects is the second course of research retained. The 
main idea is to understand how certain information, a priori specific to a firm, affects the 
wealth of the shareholders of the competitive firms. Lang and Stulz (1992) noted that 
information relative to a given firm (for example, bankruptcy announcement) can have a 
positive effect on the value of the competitive firms (competition effect), linked to a 
redistribution of market shares and profits, or a negative effect (contagion effect), resulting 
from a downward revision of expectations by the financial market for all of the firms 
belonging to the considered sector of activity. For example, in the banking industry, 
contagion effects have been highlighted by Docking et al. (1997), upon reports of a bank’s 
financial difficulties, as well as by Aharony and Swary (1996) and Akhigbe and Madura 
(2001) upon reports of bankruptcies. In addition, in the insurance sector, the results of Fenn 
and Cole (1994) also show that contagion effects exist. Furthermore, Fields et al. (1998) 
find a negative reaction of the financial market for 46 insurance firms of their sample, upon 
the report of financial difficulties of the English insurance firm Lloyd’s in the early 1990’s.  
                                                 
6 It is still important to note that the bond market in euros has considerably expanded over these last years and 
today there are almost 2200 firms registered.    5
In an original work, Akhigbe et al. (1997) study the contagion effects linked to the 
reports of changes in ratings in the U.S market. While studying 354 reports of downgrades 
of ratings between 1980 and 1993, these authors conclude on a negative average return, 
economically weak but statistically significant, for the competitive firms. Furthermore, this 
abnormal return is all the more negative since the firms with downgraded ratings hold a 
considerable market share
7. 
In light of the various results obtained in the United States, it seems pertinent to 
study in a European context the existence and persistence of contagion effects after 
downgrades of solvency ratings. Based on the results of Akhigbe et al. (1997) and adopting 
a similar approach to that of Fiels et al. (1998), we will analyze what the impact was on the 
value of shares of rivals after reports of successive downgrades of solvency ratings, or being 
put on a negative watch list, of a firm that is a leader in the market. We will consider the 
Alcatel firm, source of a downgrade of their rating and placed on the watch list on 14 
occasions over an 18 month period by the two major rating agencies in the world: Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor’s (S&P). Our work provides evidence of contagion effects among 39 
French and 27 European rivals, but some results are sensitive to the window retained for the 
calculation of abnormal returns. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we will briefly present the 
Alcatel firm, as well as the various events studied relative to their solvency rating. The 
methodology will be presented in a third section and the results will be discussed in the 
fourth section. Finally, we will synthesize our main results in the last section. 
                                                 
7 In a recent work, Caton and Goh (2003) also study the intra-group effects linked to the drop in ratings. These 
authors verify that these reports lead to a downward revision of the expectations of the financial analysts.   6
2. Downgrades of Alcatel’s bond rating 
 
2.1. Presentation of the Alcatel firm 
 
  In 2001, with a sales figure greater than 25 billion euros, Alcatel is the n°1 supplier 
of telecommunications infrastructures in the world
8. This firm, with close to 100,000 
employees around the world, occupies the top positions in markets such as high speed 
Internet and optical networks. Their portfolio includes a range of turnkey solutions, from 
the simple telephone service to the most sophisticated multimedia networks. Alcatel 
proceeded with numerous operations for external growth and their two major purchases 
were the American DSC in June of 1998, purchased for 4.4 billion dollars and Canadian 
Newbridge in February of 2002, for 6 billion dollars. 
During the first months of the year 2001, the financial situation of Alcatel 
deteriorated more or less, the same as numerous other firms evolving within the sphere of 
the “new economy”. Its market capitalization was divided by three in one year (24 billion 
euros at the end of 2001, in comparison to 75 billion at the end of 2000). Furthermore, their 
reported net profit turned negative (-5 billion euros at the end of 2001 in comparison to 1.3 
billion euros at the end of 2000), and their total amount of debts exceeded 21 billion euros 
(of which 7.6 billion were financial debts) on December 31, 2001. These financial 
developments brought about many downward revisions of ratings attributed by S&P and 
Moody’s.  
                                                 
8 Most of the information relating to the presentation of the Alcatel Company was obtained on their internet 
site (www.alcatel.fr). Information regarding the reports made by S&P and Moody’s comes from Fininfo.   7
2.2. Alcatel’s bond ratings 
 
  For the 18 month period studied (May 2001 to October 2002), the two rating 
agencies rendered negative information public on 14 occasions. Besides the 8 downgrades 
of ratings (by 8 notches from S&P and 6 notches by Moody’s), these agencies placed 
Alcatel’s solvency rating under negative watch on 6 occasions. Table 1 summarizes these 
various events (the reports from Moody’s are presented in italics). The object of this work 
is not to evaluate the capital loss of the Alcatel firm, but rather to analyze the importance of 
the contagion effects associated to these events or, in other terms, to test the impact the 
successive reports have on the value of the competitive firms. 
 




3.1. The sample 
 
The construction of our sample is based on an identification of all the French and 
European competitors of the Alcatel firm. In this regard, we have selected the division 
sector that Alcatel belongs to the DJ Euro Stoxx Technology index as well as the sectoral 
classifications of FTSE and DJ STOXX XEU Large (4 sectors: technology, communication 
technology, computer equipment, telecommunications equipment). To increase the range of 
French competitors we have selected the classification of EPA information technology. In   8
total, we have identified almost 80 competitors. The lack of stock market or financial data, 
for the period under study, forced us to eliminate some of the firms. Finally, our study is 
based on 66 competitors, 39 of whom are French and 27 European. 
  The data provided in table 2 indicates that the market value of stocks adds up to a 
mean of 6228 million euros on 31/12/2001, but there is a great dispersion between the 
firms: the median value is equal to 449 million euros. However, these firms achieved mean 
sales of 3900 million euros and their mean total net assets were equal to 5061 million euros. 
We may note here that the French firms selected are significantly smaller than the European 
ones. The market value of stocks, sales and total net assets are approximately six times 
higher for the latter. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
3.2. The variables 
 
3.2.1. Abnormal returns 
 
  To determine the effect of the downgrade of the Alcatel rating on the value of the 
competitive firms, we calculate two abnormal returns. The first corresponds to the return on 
the day of the report (ARi,t) and the second measures the reaction of the financial market 
over the period of two days (CARi). The calculation is made in the following manner:  
 
  C A R i =  ARi,t + ARi,t+1   9
with: 
CARi : the abnormal return is accumulated for a period of 2 days, including the day the 
rating agencies reported the downgrade of the rating or the placement on a negative watch 
list, and the following day (date of the publication of the information in the financial 
newspapers); 
ARi,t : the abnormal return of firm i over the period t, equal to Ri,t - E(Ri,t); 
Ri,t : the return of firm i over the period t ; 
E(Ri,t): the expected return of the firm i over the period t, estimated by way of a market 
model. We have: E(Ri,t) = α  + β .Rmt + µi,t. The parameters α  and β  of the market model are 
estimated by daily returns, over a period of 6 months (up to the day before the date of the 
event). We use the EUROSTOXX 50 index for the calculation of  the market portfolio 
return (Rmt). 
 
We retain two measures for two reasons. Firstly, they allow us to highlight the 
sensitivity throughout the time period studied. In principle, bad news should be 
immediately integrated into the course of events and the abnormal return accumulated over 
the period of two days should not be significantly different from the return measured on the 
day of the report. Secondly, two reports took place on two consecutive days (July 26 and 
27, 2001 and September 23 and 24, 2002, see table 1) and these crossover events posed a 
methodological difficulty since, in this case, only the calculation of the immediate reaction 
is pertinent.  
   10
3.2.2. Determinants of the industry counterparts’ abnormal returns 
 
  If we study the existence of contagion effects, we should also try to understand the 
magnitude of the effects. To do so, we define two types of variables. The first type relates to 
the characteristics of the reports made by the rating agencies (downgrades or placement on 
a negative watch list, number of downgrade notches, passing to a speculative category - 
junk bonds – or not, first report or confirmation). The second type relates to the 
characteristics of the rivals (evolution of return prior to the reports, solvency, growth 
opportunities, size and nationality). 
 
- The nature of the report (DEGR) 
 
  We will identify the events according to whether they relate to a placement on a 
watch list (DEGR = 0) or a downgrade (DEGR = 1). Theoretically, the market continually 
revises its expectations. In view of this, we expect a more negative reaction when the rating 
agency reveals information that appears original (placement on a watch list). In practice, the 
downgrades frequently result from a placement on a negative watch list. This anteriority 
should ease the impact of the effective downgrade of the rating on the stock market. We 
may note over the period of study that in 5 out of 8 cases of downgrades of ratings a 
placement on a negative watch list had already been reported.  
   11
- The number of downgrade notches (NOTCH) 
 
  Even if the investors continually revise their expectations, we expect a more 
significant reaction of the market in the presence of an asymmetry of information when the 
downgrade of the rating is more considerable. It seems, in fact, difficult to perfectly 
anticipate the magnitude of the downgrade by the rating agencies. The NOTCH variable 
measures the number of downgrade notches of the rating. In the case of Alcatel, we notice 
that the rating decreased 1 notch in 3 cases, 2 notches in 4 cases and 3 notches in 1 case.  
 
- The category of the rating (SPEC) 
 
  The reaction of the financial market should also be more pronounced when Alcatel 
is passing from the investment category to the speculative category (junk bonds). In this 
case, it is probable that the market will significantly revise its expectations, leading to a 
greater decrease in the value of the shares of the competitors. We notice that the bonds were 
classified in the speculative category (SPEC = 1) by Moody’s on July 9, 2002 and by S&P 
on July 12, 2002. 
 
- The timing of the report (TIME) 
 
  We also expect a more negative reaction of the investors at the time of the report of 
the first downgrade by an agency (TIME = 1), in comparison to the confirmation of the 
downgrade by the other agency. This variable allows taking into account the problem of   12
split rating, discussed particularly by Cantor et al. (1997). Concerning Alcatel, we note that 
S&P are first to report a downgrade in four out of five cases. However, at the time this 
study was carried out, Moody’s had not confirmed the last downgrade (of three notches) by 
S&P occurring in October of 2002.  
 
- Prior adjustment by the stock market (PERF1 and PERF2) 
 
  While various works (Hand et al., 1992; Ederington and Goh, 1998) have shown 
that, in general, the financial market at least partially expected the bad news, we retain two 
variables for taking into account the prior adjustment carried out by the market. PERF1 and 
PERF2 respectively correspond to the stock performance of each competitor over the period 
of two months (40 trading sessions) and the month (20 trading sessions) preceding the 
event. We form the hypothesis that the reaction of the financial market diminishes with the 
prior adjustment of the market.  
 
- Firm solvency (SOLV) 
 
  In principle, the downgrade of Alcatel’s rating should have a greater downward 
effect on the firms with weaker solvency, since the market integrates new information 
regarding business conditions (or the state of the product market) that could possibly be at 
the origin of Alcatel’s downgrade of ratings (or placement on a watch list). We retain the 
variable SOLV that corresponds to the connection between the recorded shareholder’s   13




- Growth opportunities (MMAR) 
 
  For firms with greater growth opportunities, the impact of a downgrade in solvency 
should be weaker. In fact, for these firms with projects that would produce a greater cash 
flow in the future, the risk of insolvency is weaker. Due to their historical character, the 
accounting data can only imperfectly reflect this situation. To measure the firms’ growth 
opportunities, we retain the Marris (MMAR) ratio
10. This ratio is equal to the market value 
of the shareholder’s equity in relation to the book value of the shareholder’s equity. 
 
- The size (SIZE) and nationality of the firms (FRAN) 
 
  Finally, we introduce two variables for additional control. Firstly, the size is 
estimated by using the total net assets of the firms. We assume that the small competitive 
firms are more affected by bad news than the large firms. There are two justifications that 
can be put forth. The first relates to the a greater asymmetry of information for small firms 
(less followed by the financial analysts, absence of ratings). In this context, the report of 
bad news for a competitive firm should reflect more strongly on the small firms. The 
                                                 
9 Due to the limited number of competitors possessing a solvency rating, this variable, more pertinent in 
estimating the solvency of firms, was not retained.  
10  We have verified that the use of the Tobin’s Q ratio did not modify the results obtained. This second ratio 
is calculated as follows: (Market value of the shareholder’s equity + financial debts) /(Recorded value of the 
shareholder’s equity + financial debts).   14
second is connected to the stronger diversification of large firms as much from a geographic 
point of view as from the product point of view. Due to this fact the latter are less sensitive 
to a downgrade of market conditions. The second control variable is defined by the 
nationality of the firms (FRAN=1, when the firm is French).   
 
4. Results and analysis 
 
4.1. Rivals’ reaction to Alcatel’s bond rating downgrades 
 
In table 3, the abnormal returns associated to the various events retained are 
presented. We have calculated the abnormal return of the competitive firms for the day of 
the report, as well the cumulative abnormal returns over the period of two days, including 
the day of the report and the following day. The table details the following comments.  
  First of all, the choice of accumulating the abnormal returns over the period of two 
days (or not) is not without an effect on the results obtained. In fact, for certain dates, 
significant differences exist. As an example, on 10/09/2001, the mean abnormal return for 
one day is 0.10%, with a median return equal to -0.82%, and 54.55% of the competitive 
firms registered a negative return. By accumulating the abnormal returns over a period of 
two days, we obtain significantly different results. The abnormal return amounts to 2.73%, 
with a median of 1.44% and only 43.94% of the firms had registered a negative cumulative 
abnormal return. It is therefore extremely important to not retain only a single method of 
calculation of abnormal return when analyzing this phenomenon, all the more so since the   15
financial theory, or the existing methodological works, does not allow us to conclude that 
one method of calculation is predominant over another (Brown et Warner, 1985; McKinlay, 
1997; Binder, 1998). 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
  
Secondly, it does not seem possible to conclude that there is a systematic contagion 
effect, even if we note a significantly negative abnormal return in 50% of cases. Of course, 
the mean or median returns over a period of one day are significantly negative at the time of 
certain reports (for example, on 18/05/2001, 6/08/2001 or 30/04/2001), with a percentage of 
firms registering a negative abnormal return of close to 65%. However, at the time of other 
reports, a competition effect seems to exist, since the abnormal returns are positive (for 
example on 12/07/2002 or 04/10/2002) and the percentage of firms registering a negative 
return is weaker (close to 35%). The same comments may be formulated when the returns 
are accumulated over a period of two days. We note that the latter are significantly negative 
in 5 of 14 cases (with the nonparametric test) and positive in 4 of 14 cases. The contagion 
effect seems therefore less important with this second measure, where the returns are 
accumulated over the period of two days.  
 
4.2. Cross-sectional analysis of rival firms abnormal returns 
 
The multivariate analyses will allow us to refine our initial results and to understand 
what factors lead to explaining the magnitude of the abnormal returns of the competitors.   16
Given this difference in the results with the returns over a period of one day, the day of the 
report, we will carry out regressions on the two types of abnormal returns.  
 
4.2.1. The existence of the contagion effect over the period of one day 
 
The results of the linear regressions pertaining to the abnormal returns calculated 
over the period of one day are presented in table 4. Because differences exist between the 
two measures of share performance prior to reports (PERF1 and PERF2) and that problems 
of multicolinearity appear, we present the results associated with the two models tested.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
  In accordance with our expectations, the SIZE variable seems to ease the contagion 
effect. For larger firms, that are not as subjected to informational problems (because they 
are better followed by the financial analysts), this effect seems less important. Moreover, 
according to our expectations, the TIME variable also seems to influence the contagion 
effect, even if this variable is found mostly in the second model tested; the first report of a 
downgrade by a rating agency seems to carry more weight than a confirmation of the 
downgrade by the other rating agency.  
A third, more surprising result is emphasized. It concerns the NOTCH variable. We 
notice that with a more considerable downgrade a higher abnormal return is associated, 
which was not in accordance with our expectations. This result indicates that Alcatel’s 
competitors register a higher increase in the value of their shares when the Alcatel rating   17
receives a more considerable downgrade: this result tends to indicate that competition 
effects also exist at the time of such reports. Therefore, the extent of the downgrade 
(difficult to predict) seems to lead the investors to portfolio adjustments within the same 
sector and these adjustments seem to operate in favour of the large firms. We however 
interpret this result cautiously, since it is not confirmed in the continuation of this article, 
when we use the cumulative abnormal returns in our regression. 
Finally, the significance of the PERF2 variable allows us to confirm the idea that the 
contagion effect is all the more important since the trading performance of the firms is very 
weak during the month preceding the report (PERF1 is not significant), which was 
according to our expectations.   
These different results must be interpreted with precaution, since the explanatory 
power of the models tested remains moderate. In fact, although the Fisher test was very 
significant, the coefficients of determination are close to 3%. 
 
4.2.2. The existence of a contagion effect with the cumulative abnormal returns 
 
  When we retain the cumulative abnormal returns over the period of two days, the 
results obtained seem to be more pertinent. In fact, the coefficients of determination are 
close to 7% and the values of the Fisher test are higher. As in the previous case, we present 
numerous regressions in table 5. A new sample that we qualify as “non polluted” is formed 
and includes 660 observations (66 firms multiplied by 10 reports). In this sample, the 
connected reports of July 26 and 27, 2001 as well as September 23 and 24, 2002, were   18
deleted; the existence of a downgrade on two consecutive days does not allow us to 
distinguish the impact of each of the events retained.  
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
The results, from now on, are appreciably modified, leading us to wonder about the 
delicate question of the speed of the integration of new information in the trading course of 
events as well as about the pertinence of some results published in the past. In fact, the 
methodology of the study of events is commonly used by retaining specific time periods for 
the calculation of cumulative abnormal returns
11.   
We concentrate the rest of our interpretations on the “non polluted” sample, but all 
the remarks and comments remain globally valid on the initial sample. Concerning the 
effect of the different variables, we notice that the SIZE variable remains very significant, 
confirming the idea that small firms are more negatively affected than the large firms. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of the TIME variable is always negative: the initial bad news 
reported by a rating agency leads to a more negative reaction of the value of the competitive 
firms than the confirmation of the downgrade of the rating. 
Moreover, the placement on a watch list seems to affect the value of the competitive 
firms more negatively than the report of an effective downgrade of the rating (DEGR 
variable). The informational content of the placements on a watch list seems from then on 
to be non-negligible and the less predictable character of this report is probably at the origin 
                                                 
11 It is interesting to note and to recall that the two day time period (0,1), the three day time period (0,2) or 
other time periods: (-1 ; +1), (-2 ;+2), (-5 ;+5), are regularly retained, without verification of the sensitivity of 
the results to the period of accumulation retained.   19
of the adjustments affecting the entire sector. We also note that a report of the passing of 
Alcatel’s rating from the investment category to the speculative category (“junk bond”) 
appears beneficial for their competitors (SPEC variable). This result is not surprising, if we 
consider that crossing this threshold leads to intra-group portfolio adjustments (particularly 
on behalf of the largest firms of the sector, characterized by a lesser extent of asymmetry of 
information). Finally, we notice that the NOTCH variable is the desired signal from then 




The object of this article is to study the impact of information supplied by rating 
agencies on the financial market in a context of asymmetry of information. Prior studies 
were generally focused on the consequences of the reports of downgrades of solvency 
ratings, or placement on a negative watch list, of the concerned firms (evolution of the 
value of the shareholder’s equity or the cost of bondholder financing). This work attempts 
to highlight the impact of the successive changes in ratings of a leading firm on the value of 
the shareholder’s equity of their competitors. It is at the heart of the two literatures: one is 
regarding the impact of the negative changes in ratings and one addresses the intra-group 
contagion effects.  
More precisely, we have an interest in the effect that the diverse “negative 
information” having affected the Alcatel firm (world leader in its sector) has on the value of 
the shareholder’s equity of 66 European and French competitive firms, namely 14 changes   20
in ratings and placements on a negative watch list, reported by the two principal rating 
agencies (Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s) over a period of 18 months.  
Numerous results are highlighted. First of all, the importance of the time period for 
calculation of abnormal returns, directly linked to the reaction speed of the financial market, 
must be emphasized. In fact, different results are obtained, according to if the immediate 
reaction is studied (day of the report), or if we focus on two days of trading (the day of the 
report and the day after).  
However, whatever the time period of study retained, certain variables seem to 
emerge to explain the magnitude of the abnormal returns of the competitors. In particular, 
the financial market seems to react more strongly to the report of the first public downgrade 
rather than to the confirmation of the downgrade by the second rating agency. Moreover, it 
appears that the contagion effect is more moderate for the large firms for which the 
asymmetry of information is reduced. By studying the impact of the various events over two 
days of trading, the nature of the event is important. The placement on a watch list, the 
number of notches of downgrade or the passing to the speculative category influences the 
extent of the contagion effect.  
In conclusion, it seems that, globally, the entire sector of activity that Alcatel 
belongs to is affected by the information made public by the rating agencies. This result, 
that confirms the non-negligible role played by the rating agencies on the European 
financial markets, deserves to be generalized. In particular, the study of the effects of 
reports of ratings changes within other sectors of activity seems appropriate.  
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Table 1 
Information relative to the solvency rating of Alcatel 
 
Date Agency  Report 
18 May 2001 
26 July 2001 
27 July 2001 
6 August 2001 
10 September 2001 
13 November 2001 
18 February 2002 
30 April 2002 
14 May 2002 
9 July 2002 
12 July 2002 
23 September 2002 
24 September 2002 















Placed on watch list 
Downgrade from A1 to A2 (1 notch) 
Placed on watch list 
Downgrade from A to BBB+ (2 notches) 
Downgrade from A2 to Baa1 (2 notches) 
Downgrade from BBB+ à BBB (1 notch) 
Downgrade from Baaa1 to Baaa2 (1 notch) 
Placed on watch list 
Placed on watch list 
Downgrade from Baa2 to Ba1 (2 notches) 
Downgrade from BBB to BB+ (2 notches) 
Placed on watch list 
Placed on watch list 
Downgrade from BB+ to B+ (3 notches) 
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Table 2 
Description of the sample 
 
The sample involves 66 firms, engaged in the same sector of activity as Alcatel, 39 of these firms are French 
and 27 are European. All the figures are expressed in millions of euros (dated 31/12/2001). 
 
 Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
Total sample 
Market value of stocks 
Sales  














Market value of stocks 
Sales  














Market value of stocks 
Sales  
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Table 3 
The abnormal returns associated to the different reports of the rating agencies 
 
The sample involves 66 firms, engaged in the same sector of activity as Alcatel, 39 of these firms are French 
and 27 are European. 
t (p) corresponds to the statistic of Student and the probability associated with this statistic. 
z (p) corresponds to the statistic of Wilcoxon and the probability associated with this statistic. 
*, ** and *** represent significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
  Abnormal return (over a period of one day) 
Date Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
% AR < 0  t (p)   z (p)  
18/05/01 -0,99% -0,69%  2,55%  63,64%    -3.15  (0,002)*** -2,99  (0,003)*** 
26/07/01  -0,70%  -0,70%  2,78%  62,12%  -2,03 (0,047)**  -2,46 (0,014)** 
27/07/01  0,29%  0,04%  3,67%  48,48%  0,65 (0,520)  0,41 (0,680) 
06/08/01 -1,04% -0,91%  3,43%  63,64%  -2,47  (0,016)**  -2,57  (0,010)*** 
10/09/01  0,10%  -0,82%  5,21%  54,55%  0,16 (0,877)  -0,40 (0,690) 
13/11/01  0,71%  -0,01%  4,49%  50,00%  1,29 (0,203)  0,28 (0,781) 
18/02/02  -0,26%  0,07%  2,11%  48,48%  -0,99 (0,326)  0,54 (0,589) 
30/04/02  -0,72%  -0,89%  3,10%  69,70%  -1,88 (0,064)*  -2,78 (0,006)*** 
14/05/02  0,02%  -0,22%  2,54%  56,06%  0,05 (0,961)  -0,06 (0,952) 
09/07/02  -0,95%  -0,66%  3,55%  57,58%  -2,18 (0,033)**  -2,24 (0,025)** 
12/07/02  1,67%  1,45%  3,66%  33,33%  3,71 (0,000)***  3,47 (0,001)*** 
23/09/02 -1,92% -1,29%  5,25%  63,64%  -2,98  (0,004)*** -3,09  (0,002)*** 
24/09/02 -3,07% -3,55%  6,29%  63,64%  -3,96  (0,000)*** -3,82  (0,000)*** 
04/10/02  0,87%  0,58%  4,57%  37,88%  1,55 (0,127)  1,54 (0,125) 
  Cumulative abnormal returns (over a period of two days) 
Date Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation 
% AR < 0  t (p) *  z (p) ** 
18/05/01  -0,26%  -0,61%  4,74%  54,55%  -0,45 (0,657)  -0,90 (0,366) 
26/07/01  -0,40%  -0,66%  4,07%  57,58%  -0,80 (0,424)  -0,88 (0,376) 
27/07/01  0,88%  -0,19%  7,61%  51,52%  0,94 (0,351)  -0,41 (0,680) 
06/08/01 -0,78% -0,82%  4,26%  63,64% -1,49  (0,140) -1,95  (0,052)* 
10/09/01  2,73%  1,44%  9,11%  43,94%  2,43 (0,018)**  2,12 (0,034)** 
13/11/01  3,36%  1,76%  8,16%  30,30%  3,35 (0,001)***  3,50 (0,001)*** 
18/02/02  0,01%  0,95%  4,02%  39,39%  0,03 (0,978)  1,31 (0,189) 
30/04/02 -0,33% -1,05%  5,52%  71,21% -0,48  (0,630)  -2,82  (0,005)*** 
14/05/02  -0,68%  -0,46%  4,88%  59,09%  -1,14 (0,260)  -0,72 (0,472) 
09/07/02  1,45%  1,50%  4,13%  39,39%  2,85 (0,006)***  2,72 (0,007)*** 
12/07/02  4,65%  4,29%  5,31%  19,70%  7,12 (0,000)***  5,80 (0,000)*** 
23/09/02 -4,99% -5,07%  8,88%  72,73%  -4,57  (0,000)*** -4,39  (0,000)*** 
24/09/02  -2,18%  -0,77%  8,12%  59,09%  -2,18 (0,033)**  -2,03 (0,043)** 
04/10/02 -1,41% -1,80%  6,78%  60,61%  -1,69  (0,096)*  -2,20  (0,028)** 
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Table 4 
OLS regressions with abnormal returns calculated over the period of one day. 
The sample involves 924 observations (14 reports for 66 competitors). The explanatory variables are defined as follows: PERF1 is the 
return of each competitor during the 40 trading sessions preceding the report; PERF2 is the return of each competitor during the 20 
trading sessions preceding the report; SOLV is the solvency ratio for each competitor, equal to the recorded shareholder’s equity divided 
by the total liabilities; MMAR is the Marris ratio, equal to the market value of the shareholder’s equity divided by the recorded value of 
the shareholder’s equity;  ln(SIZE) is the logarithm of the size of the competitors, corresponding to the total net assets (in millions of 
euros);  FRAN is equal to 1 if the competitor is French and equal to 0 if the competitor is European; DEGR is equal to 1 if the report is a 
downgrade of the solvency rating of Alcatel and equal to 0 if it is a report of placement on a watch list; NOTCH is equal to the number of 
notches of downgrade of Alcatel’s solvency rating; SPEC is equal to 1 if the downgrade leads to Alcatel’s rating being classified in the 
speculative category; TIME is equal to 1 for the first report of downgrade and equal to 0 if it is a confirmation of the downgrade by the 
other rating agency. 
F is the Fischer statistic, t is the Student statistic and p is the probability associated with the tests. 
*, ** and *** represent significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
  AR0 AR0 
Constant -0,012  -0,011 
t -2,738  -2,477 
p 0,006  ***  0,013 ** 
PERF1 0,005   
t 0,948  
p 0,343   
PERF2   0,014 
t   1,869 
p   0,062  * 
SOLV 0,004 0,004 
t 0,667  0,609 
p 0,505  0,543 
MMAR 0,000  0,000 
t -0,085  -0,048 
p 0,932  0,962 
lnSIZE 0,004  0,004 
t 2,178  2,194 
p  0,030 **  0,028 ** 
FRAN 0,002 0,002 
t 0,515  0,579 
p 0,607  0,562 
DEGR 0,004  0,002 
t 0,650  0,325 
p 0,516  0,745 
NOTCH 0,006  0,007 
t 1,798  2,123 
p 0,073  *  0,034  ** 
SPEC 0,003 0,003 
t 0,724  0,679 
p 0,469  0,497 
TIME -0,006 -0,008 
t -1,602  -1,877 
p 0,109    0,061  * 
r² 0,029  0,032 
F 3,064  3,361 
P  0,001 ***  0,000 *** 
N 924  924 
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Table 5 
OLS regressions with abnormal returns accumulated over a period of two days. 
The sample involves 924 observations (14 reports for 66 competitors) and 660 observations (10 reports multiplied by 66 competitors) 
respectively. The explanatory variables are defined as follows:  PERF1 is the return of each competitor during the 40 trading sessions 
preceding the report; PERF2 is the return of each competitor during the 20 trading sessions preceding the report; SOLV is the solvency 
ratio for each competitor, equal to the recorded shareholder’s equity divided by the total liabilities; MMAR is the Marris ratio, equal to the 
market value of the shareholder’s equity divided by the recorded value of the shareholder’s equity; ln(SIZE) is the logarithm of the size of 
the competitors, corresponding to the total net assets (in millions of euros) ; FRAN is equal to 1 if the competitor is French and equal to 0 
if the competitor is European; DEGR is equal to 1 if the report is a downgrade of the solvency rating of Alcatel and equal to 0 if it is a 
report of placement on a watch list; NOTCH is equal to the number of notches of downgrade of Alcatel’s solvency rating; SPEC is equal 
to 1 if the downgrade leads to Alcatel’s rating being classified in the speculative category; TIME is equal to 1 for the first report of 
downgrade and equal to 0 if it is a confirmation of the downgrade by the other rating agency. 
F is the Ficher statistic, t is the Student statistic and p is the probability associated with the tests. 
*, ** and *** represent significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
  CAR(0,1) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,1) 
Constant  -0,006 -0,003 -0,002 -0,001 
t  -0,871 -0,413 -0,270 -0,152 
p 0,384  0,679  0,787  0,879 
PERF1  -0,001  -0,014  
t -0,056  -1,321  
p  0,955  0,187  
PERF2   0,020  -0,007 
t   1,584  -0,447 
p   0,113  0,655 
SOLV 0,001 0,000 -0,002 -0,003 
t  0,097 -0,007 -0,154 -0,232 
p 0,923  0,995  0,877  0,817 
MMAR 0,000  0,000  0,001  0,001 
t -0,569  -0,619  1,071  0,959 
p 0,570  0,536  0,285  0,338 
lnSIZE 0,006  0,006  0,006  0,006 
t 2,061  2,056  1,726  1,697 
p  0,040 **  0,040 **  0,085 *  0,090 * 
FRAN -0,008 -0,007 -0,006 -0,006 
t  -1,428 -1,418 -0,966 -1,046 
p 0,154  0,156  0,334  0,296 
DEGR 0,035  0,030  0,045  0,042 
t 3,829  3,291  4,369  4,125 
p  0,000 ***  0,001 ***  0,000 ***  0,000 *** 
NOTCH  -0,008 -0,005 -0,015 -0,013 
t  -1,474 -0,900 -2,859 -2,463 
p 0,141  0,368  0,004  ***  0,014 ** 
SPEC 0,027 0,028 0,022 0,024 
t 3,963  4,063  3,387  3,723 
p  0,000 ***  0,000 ***  0,001 ***  0,000 *** 
TIME -0,007 -0,010 -0,010 -0,011 
t  -1,106 -1,561 -1,719 -1,827 
p  0,269  0,119  0,086 *  0,068 * 
r² 0,067  0,070  0,075  0,073 
F 7,342  7,640  5,847  5,661 
p  0,000 ***  0,000 ***  0,000 ***  0,000 *** 
N  924 924 660 660 
 